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THEISM, PLATONISM, AND THE METAPHYSICS
OF MATHEMATICS
Christopher Menzel

In a previous paper, Thomas V. Morris and I sketched a view on which abstract objects,
in particular, properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs), are created by God no less
than contingent, concrete objects. In this paper r suggest a way of extending this account
to cover mathematical objects as well. Drawing on some recent work in logic and
metaphysics, I also develop a more detailed account of the structure of PRPs in answer
to the paradoxes that arise on a naive understanding of the structure ofthe abstract universe.

§ 1 The Dilemma of the Theistic Platonist

Theists generally hold that God is the creator of all there is distinct from himself.
Traditionally, the scope of God's creative activity has extended across two
disjoint realms: The physical, whose chief exemplars are ordinary middle-size
objects, and the mental or spiritual, encompassing such things as angels and
souls. Now, many theists are also platonists, or "metaphysical realists." That
is, in addition to the physical and mental realms, some theists also acknowledge
the existence of a realm of abstract objects like numbers, sets, properties, and
propositions. For such theists, the traditional understanding of creation presents
a philosophical and theological dilemma. On the platonist conception, most, if
not all, abstract objects are thought to exist necessarily. One can either locate
these entities outside the scope of God's creative activity or not. If the former,
then it seems the believer must compromise his view of God: rather than the
sovereign creator and lord of all things visible and invisible, God turns out to
be just one more entity among many in a vast constellation of necessary beings
existing independently of his creative power. If the latter, the believer is faced
with the problem of what it could possibly mean for God to create an object
that is both necessary and abstract.
Though not utterly incompatible with a robust theism, the first hom of the
dilemma seems undesirable for the theistic platonist. God remains the greatest
possible being, since, presumably, it is not possible for any being to exert any
influence over abstract entities; but the platonist must put severe, indeed embarrassing, qualifications on the scope of God's creative activity and on his status
as the source of all existence. This leaves the platonist with the second hom,
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viz., making sense of the idea of creation with respect to necessary, abstract
objects. In a separate paper, Tom Morris and I have argued that sense can indeed
be made of this idea. 1
An early obstacle to avoid is the (roughly) deistic model of the creation. On
this model, God's creation of an object is conceived of as a distinct, isolable,
temporally located event of (at most) finite duration, and after its occurrence the
object continues to exist of its own ontological momentum. This model is no
doubt incompatible with the thesis at hand, since there could be no time at which
God could have brought a necessary, hence eternal, being into existence. But
there is just no a priori reason whatever to rule out the possibility of eternal
creatures. Hence, a more subtle model is needed.
A model that is both philosophically and theologically sounder on this point
is that of continuous creation. In its most fundamental sense, to create something
is to cause it to be, to playa direct causal role in its existing. 2 It is this broader
conception of creation that is incorporated in the model in question. On that
model, God is always playing a direct causal role in the existence of his creatures;
his creative activity is essential to a creature's existence at all times throughout
its temporal career, irrespective of whether or not there happens to be a specific
time at which he begins to cause it to exist. 3 This then provides us with a
framework in which it can be coherently claimed that God creates absolutely all
objects, necessary or not: one simply holds that, necessarily, for any object a
(other than God himself) and time t, God plays a direct causal role in a's existing
at t.'
With that obstacle removed, the next step is to give some account of the sort
of causal relation there could be between God and the abstract objects we want
to claim he creates. Here Morris and I essentially just reclothe the venerable
doctrine of divine ideas in contemporary garb. We call the refurbished doctrine
"theistic activism." Very briefly, the idea is this. We take properties, relations,
and propositions (PRPs, for short) to be the contents of a certain kind of divine
intellective activity in which God, by his nature, is essentially engaged. To grasp
a PRP, then, whether by abstracting from perceptual experience, or perhaps by
"combining" PRPs already grasped, is to grasp a product of the divine intellect,
a divine idea. This divine activity is thus causally efficacious: PRPs, as abstract
products of God's "mental life," exist at any given moment because God is
thinking them;5 which is just to say that he creates them.
§2 Activism, Numbers, and Sets

With regard to PRPs then, the activist model provides a coherent, substantive
(if programmatic) account of the sort of activity in which God is engaged that
gives rise to abstract objects. On the face of it, though, a substantial, indeed
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perhaps the most important, portion of the abstract universe is not obviously
accounted for, viz., the abstract ontology of mathematics. In particular, how do
numbers and sets fit into the picture? Traditionally, these entities are not thought
of as PRPs of any kind, and hence they find no clear place in the story thus far.
I want to argue that a place can be found, though the search is going to lead
us into some fairly deep waters. Let's begin with numbers. A natural view of
the numbers, as I will argue below, is that they are properties. For the past
century, however, the dominant view of the numbers has been that they are
abstract particulars of one kind or another. The philosophical roots of this view
go back to Frege, in particular, to one of his most distinctive doctrines: that
there is an inviolable ontological divide between the denotations (Bedeutungen)
of predicates, or concepts (Begrijfe), and the denotations of singular temls, or
objects (Gegenstiinde). Taking 'property' to be a loose synonym for 'concept',
this doctrine entails that no property can be denoted by a singular term. Since
in mathematics the numbers are in fact denoted by singular terms, e.g., most
saliently, the numerals, it follows that the numbers are not properties but objects,
or, loosely once again, particulars.
Now, while few would dispute the inviolability of the distinction between
properties and particulars, there are well known and notorious difficulties with
the idea that this is simultaneously a distinction between the semantic values of
predicates and the semantic values of singular terms. 6 We needn't rehearse these
in detail here. For present purposes, let's just note first that our ordinary usage
itself doesn't easily square with Frege's doctrine. For there exist a prodigious
number of singular terms in natural language that, to all appearances, refer
straightforwardly to properties: abstract singUlar terms (,wisdom', 'redness'),
infinitives (,to dance', 'to raise chickens'), gerunds ('being faster than Willie
Gault', 'running for president'), etc. Now, there are several non-Fregean semantic
theories in which this fact of natural language is preserved, i.e., theories that
are type-free in the sense that difference in ontological type (property, particular,
etc.) is not reflected in a difference of semantic type (referent of predicate,
referent of singular term, etc.) that prevents singular terms from referring to
properties. 7 Hence, we can consistently maintain, pace Frege, that at least some
properties are the semantic values of both predicates and singular terms. There
are thus good reasons for rejecting Frege's semantic doctrine, and hence no
cogent reasons for rejecting the idea that numbers are properties, a priori on
Fregean grounds.
There are two plausible accounts that identify the numbers with properties,
both of which trace their origins back to the beginnings of contemporary
mathematical logic. The first extends back to Frege himself. Frege clearly saw
that statements of number typically involve the predication of a numerical property
of some kind. For Frege, what is involved is the predication of such a property
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to a concept. Thus, for example, the statement "There are four moons of Jupiter"
is the predication of the property having four instances (which is expressed by
the quantifier 'There are four') of the concept moons of Jupiter. Frege's concepti
object doctrine however prevented him from taking this property itself to be the
number four, assigning that function rather to its extension. s As we've just seen,
though, one needn't follow Frege here. In the absence of this doctrine, one is
free to make the identification in question, and hence, in general, to take the
number n to be the property of having n instances. 9
Cantor suggested a different though related view in his (often entirely opaque)
discussions of the nature of number. Cantor's insight was that the notion of
number is understood most clearly in terms of a special relation between sets:
we associate the same number with two sets just in case they are "equivalent,"
i.e., just in case a one-to-one correspondence can be established between the
members of the sets. In assigning the same number to two sets then, we are
isolating a common property the two sets share; such properties (roughly) Cantor
identifies as the cardinal numbers. In his words, the cardinal number of a given
set Mis
the general concept under which fall all and only those sets which are
equivalent to the given set. 10
More precisely, the number n is a property common to all and only n membered
sets, or more simply, the property of having n members." Russell presents
essentially the same account in The Principles of Mathematics, though he ultimately rejects it (unnecessarily, as it happens) because of problems he finds with
its nonextensional character. 12
There are thus at least two ways of understanding the numbers to be properties,
both of which are natural and appealing. The first, quasi-Fregean account has a
semantical bent, focussing in particular on the predicative nature of statements
of number, while the Cantorian account emphasizes the intuitive connection
between number and relative size in the more general, abstract form of one-to-one
correspondence between sets. Both, however, provide us with good reasons for
thinking that numbers are properties of some kind. If so, we have found room
for numbers within our theistic framework.
Now, of course, if we adopt the Cantorian view of number, then it obviously
remains to explain just how sets fit into our picture. We could avoid this question
by choosing instead the quasi-Fregean picture, since it makes no appeal to sets.
We will not so choose, however, for two reasons. First, for reasons I will not
go into here, I think the Cantorian view is the superior of the two accounts.
Second, perhaps more importantly, we want to be able to give our picture the
broadest possible scope, and hence we want it to encompass all manner of
abstract flora and fauna whose existence platonism might endorse.
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So what then are we to say about sets? Are they too assimilable into our
framework as it stands? Formally, yes. Both George Bealer and Michael Jubien,
for instance, have developed theories in which sets are identified with certain
"set-like" properties; roughly, a set {a,b, ... } is taken to be the property being
identical with a or being identical with b or .... '3 Given sufficiently powerful
property theoretic axioms, one can then show that analogues of the usual axioms
of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory hold for these set-like properties, and hence that
one loses none of the mathematical power of standard set theory.
But this is not an altogether happy move. For instance, as Cocchiarella has
noted, intuitively, sets are just not the same sort of thing as properties. Sets are
generally thought of as being wholly constituted by their members; a set, "has
its being in the objects which belong to it. "14 This conception is deeply at odds
with the view of PRPs that underlies metaphysical realism, according to which
PRPs "are in no sense to be thought of as having their being in the objects which
are their instances. "[5 Since however it is this very idea of sets as having their
being in their members that motivates the axioms of ZF, and since this is an
inappropriate conception of properties, there seems to be no adequate motivation
for a ZF style property theory.
So there is at least ground for suspicion of the thesis that sets are just a species
of property. It would be desirable, then, if our account could respect the intuitive
distinction between the two sorts of entity. In particular, we should like to trace
the origin of sets to a different, and more appropriate, sort of divine activity
than that to which we've traced the origin of PRPs. But what sort? Here we
have a fairly rich (though often unduly obscure) line of thought to draw upon
from the philosophy of set theory. A common idea one often encounters in
expositions of the notion of set is that sets are "built up" or "constructed" in
some way out of previously given objects. '6 Though generally taken to be no
more than a helpful metaphor in explaining the contemporary iterative conception
of set, a number of thinkers seem to have endorsed the idea at a somewhat more
literal level. Specifically, their writings suggest that sets are the upshots of a
certain sort of constructive mental activity.
Adumbrations of this idea can be seen in the very origins of set theory. Cantor
himself held that the existence of a set was a matter of thinking of a plurality
as a unity. 17 His distinguished mentor Dedekind is plausibly taken to be embracing
a similar line when he writes that
[i]t very frequently happens that different things ... can be considered
from a common point of view, can be associated in the mind, and we
say they foml a system S .... Such a system (an aggregate, a manifold,
a totality) as an object of our thought is likewise a thing. 18
Comparable thoughts are expressed by Hausdorff, Fraenkel, and more recently
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by Schoenfield, Rucker, and Wang.!9 Of these it is Wang who seems to develop
the idea most extensively. He writes:
It is a basic feature of reality that there are many things. When a
multitude of given objects can be collected together, we arrive at a set.
For example, there are two tables in this room. We are ready to view
them as given both separately and as a unity, and justify this by pointing
to them or looking at them or thinking about them either one after the
other or simultaneously. Somehow the viewing of certain objects
together suggests a loose link which ties the objects together in our
intuition. 20
I interpret this passage in the following way. Wang here is keying on a basic
feature of our cognitive capacities: the ability to selectively direct one's attention
to certain objects and collect or gather them together mentally, to view them in
such a way as to "tie them together in our intuition;" in Cantorian terms, to think
of them as a unity. Wang stresses the particular manifestation of this capacity
in perception, one of a number of related human perceptual capacities emphasized
especially by the early Gestalt psychologists. 21 It is best illustrated for our purposes
by a simple example. Consider the following array:

* * *
* * *
* * *
Think of the asterisks as being numbered left to right from 1 to 9, beginning at
the upper left hand corner. While focussing on the middle dot 5, it is possible
to vary at will which dots in the array stand out in one's visual field (with perhaps
the exception of 5 itself), e.g., [1,5,9], [2,4,5,6,8], or even [1,5,8,9]. The dots
thus picked out, I take Wang to be saying, are to be understood as the elements
of a small "set" existing in the mind of the perceiver.
The account obviously won't do as it stands. The axiom of extensionality, for
instance, seems not to hold on this picture: if you and I direct our attention to
the same dots, then each of us has his own "set", despite the fact that they have
the same members. More importantly, human cognitive limitations put a severe
restriction on the number and size of sets there can be. Wang is well aware of
this, and hence builds an account of the nature of sets based on an idealized
notion of collecting. Irrespective of the success of Wang's efforts, such an
idealization, I believe, can be of use to us here in developing a model of divine
activity that works sets into our activist framework.
The idea is simple enough: we take sets to be the products of a collecting
activity on God's part which we model on our own perceptual collecting
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capacities. Consider first all the things that are not sets in this sense. While the
number of these "first order" objects that we can apprehend at any given time
is extremely limited, presumably God suffers from no such limitations; all of
them fall under his purview. Furthermore, we can suppose that his awareness
is not composed of more or less discrete experiential episodes the way ours is,
and hence that he is capable of generating, not just one collection of first order
objects at a time, but all possible collections of them simultaneously. 22 We
suppose next that, once generated, the "second order" products of this collecting
activity on first order objects are themselves candidates for "membership" in
further collectings, and hence that God can produce also all possible "third order"
collections that can be generated out of all the objects of the first two orders.
The same of course ought to hold for these latter collections, and for the collections
generated from them, and so on, for all finite orders. Finally, in a speculative
application of the doctrine of divine infinitude, we postulate that there are no
determinate bounds on God's collecting activity, and hence that it extends
unbounded through the Cantorian infinite. 23
Identifying sets with the products of God's collecting activity, then, and supposing that God in fact does all the collecting it is possible for him to do, what
we have is a full set theoretic cumulative hierarchy as rich as in any platonic
vision. In this way we locate not just the platonist's PRPs, but the entire ontology
of sets as well firmly within the mind of God.
§3 A Volatile Ontology

Alas, but as is so often wont to be the case in matters such as this, things are
more complicated than they appear. The lessons of the last hundred years are
clear that caution is to be enjoined in constructing an ontology that includes sets
and PRPs. Too easily the abstract scientist, eager to exploit the philosophical
power of a platonic ontology, finds himself engaged unwittingly in a metaphysical
alchemy in which the rich ore of platonism is transmuted into the worthless dross
of inconsistency. Our account thus far is a laboratory ripe for such a transmutation.
There are several paradoxes that, on natural assumptions, are generated in the
account as it stands.
The first traces its lineage back to Russell, who reported a related paradox
(distinct from the one bearing his name) in §500 of the Principles. 24 In the
cumulative or "iterative" picture of sets we've developed here, all the things that
are not sets form the basic stuff on top of which the cumulative hierarchy is
constructed. Now, the chief intuition behind the iterative picture, one implicit
in our theistic model above, is that any available objects can be collected into
a set; the "available" objects at any stage form the basis of new sets in the next
stage. Thus, since propositions are not sets, all the propositions there are are
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among the atoms ofthe cumulative hierarchy; and since all the atoms are available
for collecting (God, after all, apprehends them all "prior" to his collecting),
there is a set S of all propositions. I take it as a basic logical principle that for
any entities x and y and any property P,
(*) if x

'* y, then

[~Px]

'*

[~Py],25

i.e., that if x is not identical with y, then the proposition [~Px] that x is P is
not identical with the proposition [~Py] that y is P.26 Consider then any property
you please; the property SET of being a set, say. Then by (*), there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Pow(S) (the power set of S) and the set T = ([~
SET(s)] : s E Pow(S)}. But T ~ S, since T is a set of propositions, hence Pow(S)
?,:- S,>7 contradicting Cantor's theorem.
A strictly analogous paradox arises for properties (and, in general, relations
as well). This is true in particular if one holds that every object a has an essence,
i.e., the property being a, or perhaps being identical with a. 28 For the same
reasons we gave in the case of propositions, properties (and relations) are also
among the atoms of the cumulative hierarchy, and hence there is a set M of all
properties. Essences being what they are, we have, for any x and y, that
(**) if x

'* y, then Ex '* Ey,

where E z is the essence of z. Consider then Pow(M). By (**) there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Pow(M) and the set E = {E z : Z E Pow(M)}. But E ~
M, since E is a set of properties, hence Pow(M) ,,;: M, contradicting Cantor
once again. 29
There are three quick replies to these related paradoxes to consider. The first
is to question the fine-grainedness principles (*) and (**). Certainly there are
views of PRPs on which this would be appropriate. Possible worlds theorists in
the tradition of Montague, for example, define PRPs such that they are identical
if necessarily coextensional, a "coarse-grained" view incompatible with the finegrained view we are advocating here. Similarly, views that might be broadly
classified as "Aristotelian" hold that properties and relations exist first and
foremost "in" the objects that have them, not separate from them, and are
"abstracted" somehow by the mind. Such views rarely find any need for PRPs
any more fine-grained than are needed to distinguish one state of an object, or
one connection between several objects, from another. Whatever the appeal of
these alternatives, the problem is that they are out of keeping with our activist
model. If we are pushing the idea that PRPs are literally the products of God's
conceiving activity, then it would seem that properties which intuitively differ
in content, i.e., which are such that grasping one does not entail simultaneously
grasping the other, could not be the products of exactly the same intellective
activity and hence must be distinct. This is especially pronounced in the cases
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of singular propositions and essences that "involve" distinct individuals, such as
those with which we are concerned in (*) and (**); it is just not plausible that,
e.g., singular propositions "about" distinct individuals could nonetheless be the
products of the same activity. To abandon these principles in the context of our
present framework, then, would be unpalatable.
The second reply is simply to deny the power set axiom. After all, one might
argue, many set theorists find the axiom dubious; so why suppose it is true in
general, and in the arguments at hand in particular?
The power set axiom has indeed been called into question by mathematical
logicians and philosophers of mathematics over the years. The root cause of this
disaffection, however, has always been the radically nonconstructive character
of the axiom-mathematicians are not in general able to specify any sort of
general property or procedure that will enable them to pick out every arbitrary
subset of a given set. In this sense, it is the platonic axiom par excellence,
declaring sets to exist in utter spite of any human capacity to grasp or "construct"
them.
It should be clear that any sort of objection on these grounds, as with the
previous objection, is just out of place here. For obviously we are far from
supposing that set existence has anything whatever to do with human cognitive
capacities. Quite the contrary; on our model, the puzzle would rather be how
the power set axiom could not be true. For supposing that God has collected
some set s, since each of its members falls under his purview just as the elements
of some small finite collection of our own construction fall under ours, how
could he not be capable of generating all possible collections that can be formed
from members of s as well? So this response to the paradoxes is ineffective. 3D
The third reply is that, since there are at least as many propositions (and
properties) as there are sets, it is evident that there is no set S of all propositions
any more than there is a set of all sets; there are just "too many" of them. Hence
the argument above breaks down. The same goes for properties, so the second
paradox fares no better.
Briefly, the problem with this reply is that how many of a given sort of thing
there are in and of itself has nothing whatever to do with whether or not there
is a set of those things. 31 The reason there is no set of all sets is not because
there are "too many" of them, but rather because there is no "top" to the cumulative
hierarchy, no definite point at which no further sets can be constructed. On our
model as it stands, however, as nonsets, the propositions and properties there
are exist "prior" (in a conceptual sense) to the construction of all the sets. Hence,
they are all equally available for membership. But if so, there seems no reason
for denying the existence of the sets Sand M.32 So an appeal to how many PRPs
there are won't tum back the arguments.
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§4 A Russell-Type Solution

Though always discomfiting, the discovery of paradox needn't necessarily
spell disaster. As in the case of set theory, it may rather be an occasion for
insight and clarification. Russell's original paradox of naive set theory was
grounded in a mistaken conception of the structure of sets that was uncovered
with the development of the iterative picture. Perhaps, in the same way, the
paradoxes here have taken root in a similar misconception about PRPs. There
are two avenues to explore.
The final paragraph in the last section uncovers a crucial assumption at work
in the paradoxes: that all PRPs are conceptually prior to the construction of the
sets; or again, that all the PRPs there are are among the atoms of the hierarchy.
The Russellian will challenge this. He will argue that one cannot so cavalierly
divide the world into an ordered hierarchy of sets on the one hand and a logically
unstructured domain of nonsets on the other. For although they are not sets, the
non sets too fall into a natural hierarchy of logical types. More specifically, in
the simple theory of types, concrete and abstract particulars, or "individuals",
are the entities of the lowest type, usually designated 'i'. Then, recursively,
where t 1 , •.• , tn are types, let (I]> ... , t n ) be the type of n-place relation that takes
entities of these n types as its arguments. So, for example, a property of individuals
would be of type (i); a 2-place relation between individuals and properties of
individuals would be of type (i,(i»; and so on. The type of any entity is thus,
in an easily definable sense, higher than the type of any of its possible arguments. 33
By dividing entities whose types are the same height into disjoint levels we
arrive at a hierarchy of properties and relations analogous to, but rather more
complicated than, the (finite) levels of the cumulative hierarchy.
To wed this conception with our current model we propose that both sets and
PRPs are built up together in the divine intellect so that we have God both
constructing new sets and conceiving new PRPs in every level of the resulting
hierarchy. Thus, at the most basic level are individuals; at the next level God
constructs all sets of individuals and conceives all properties and relations that
take individuals as arguments; at the next level he constructs all sets of entities
of the first two levels and conceives all properties and relations that take entities
of the previous (and perhaps both previous) level(s) as arguments; and so on.
Thus, since there are new PRPs at every level, it is evident that there will be
no level at which there occurs, e.g., the set of all properties, and hence it seems
that the paradoxes above can be explained in much the same way as Russell's
original paradox. 34
Easier said than done. Serious impediments stand in the way of implementing
these ideas. First of all, there are several well known objections to type theory
that are no less cogent here than in other contexts. For example, on a typed
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conception of PRPs, there can be no universal properties, such as the property
of being self-identical, since no properties have all entities in their "range of
significance."35 The closest approximation to them are properties true of everything of a given type. But, thinking in terms of our model, even if many PRPs
are typed, there seems no reason why God shouldn't also be able to conceive
properties whose extensions, and hence whose ranges of significance, include
all entities whatsoever.
Along these same lines, type theory also prevents any property from falling
within its own range of significance, and in particular it mles out the possibility
of self-exemplification. Thus, for example, there can be no such thing as the
property of being a property, or of being abstract, but only anemic, typed images
of these more robust properties at each level, true only of the properties or
abstract entities of the previous level.
Standard problems aside, much more serious problems remain. In many simple
type theories, including our brief account above, propositions are omitted
altogether. Those that make room for them 36 lump them all together in a single
type (quite rightly, in the context of simple type theory). This clearly won't do
on the current proposal since the entities of any given type are all at the same
level and hence form a set at the next level, thus allowing in sufficient air to
revive our first paradox.
A related difficulty is that this proposal is still vulnerable to a modified version
of the second paradox as well. Consider any relation that holds between individuals u and sets s of properties of individuals, e.g., the relation I that holds
between u and s just in case u exemplifies some member of s. Let A be the set
of all properties of individuals. For each s E Pow(A), we have the property [Ax
Ixs] of bearing I to s. By a generalization of the fine-grainedness schemas (*)
and (**) (cf. note 29), for all s,s' E Pow(A) we have that
(***) if s

=1=

s', then [Ax Ixs]

=1=

[Ax Isx'].

Consider now the set 1* = {[Ax lxs] : s E Pow(A)}. By (***) there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Pow(A) and 1*. But 1* ~ A, since 1* is a set of
properties of individuals. Hence, Pow(A) ~'A, contradicting Cantor's theorem.
A little reflection reveals a feature common to both paradoxes that seems to
lie at the heart of the difficulty. First, we need an intuitive fix on the idea of
(the existence of) one entity "presupposing the availability of' another. The idea
we're after is simple: for God to create (i.e., construct or conceive) certain
entities, he must have "already" created certain others; the former, that is to say,
presuppose the availability of the latter. For sets this is clear. Say that an entity
e is a constituent of a set s just in case it is a member of the transitive closure
of S.37 Then we can say that a set s presupposes the availability of some entity
e just in case e is a constituent of s. For PRPs we need to say a little more. As
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suggested above, there seems a clear sense in which PRPs, like sets, can be
said to have constituents. Thus, a set-like "singleton" property such as [Ax x =
Kripke] contains Kripke as a constituent. But not just Kripke; for the identity
relation too is a part of the property's make-up, or "internal structure;" it is, one
might say, a structured composite of those two entities. (We will develop this
idea in somewhat more detail shortly.) Combining the two notions of constituency
(one for sets, one for PRPs), we can generalize the concept of presupposition
to both sets and PRPs: one entity e presupposes the availability of another e*
just in case e* is a constituent of e.
Now, even though the properties [Ax Ixs] are properties of individuals, if we
look at their internal structure, we see that many of these properties presuppose
the availability of entities that themselves presuppose the availability of those
very properties, to wit, those properties P = [Axlxs] such thatP E s. (Analogously
for those propositions p = [A SET(s)] such that pES.) Call such properties
self-presupposing; this notion alone, independent of the power set axiom and
our fine-grainedness principles, is sufficient for generating Russell-type paradoxes. 38 Conjoined with power set and fine-grainedness, the possibility of self-presupposing properties can be held responsible for the sort of unrestrained proliferation of PRPs of (in general) any type that fuels the Cantor-style paradoxes
as well.
The source of all our paradoxes, then, in broader terms, lies in a failure so
far adequately to capture the dependence of complex PRPs on their internal
constituents. What we want, then, is a model that is appropriately sensitive to
internal structure, but which at the same time does not run afoul of the standard
problems of type theory.
§5 A Constructive Solution

Let's review. Our excursion into type theory was prompted by doubts over
the idea that PRPs are conceptually prior to the construction of sets. Type theory
suggested an alternative: PRPs themselves form a hierarchy analogous to the
cumulative hierarchy of sets such that a PRP's place in the hierarchy depends
on the kind of arguments it can sensibly take. The idea then was to join the two
sorts of hierarchy into one. However, even overlooking the standard problems
of type theory, we found that the resulting activist model (-sketch) was still
subject to paradox. Our analysis of these paradoxes led us to see that our problems
stemmed from the fact that our models were insensitive to the dependence of
PRPs on their internal constituents.
How, then, do we capture this dependence? Here we can draw on some recent
ideas in logic and metaphysics. Logically complex PRPs are naturally thought
of as being "built up" from simpler entities by the application of a variety of
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logical operations. For example, any two PRPs can be seen as the primary
constituents of a further PRP, their conjunction, which is the result of a conjoining
operation. Thus, in particular, the conjunction of two properties P and Q can
he thought of as the relation [Axy Px & Qy] that a bears to b just in case Pa and
Qb. A further operation, reflection, can be understood to act so as to transform
this relation into the property [Ax Px & Qx] of having P and Q. Related operations
can be taken to yield complements (e.g., [Ax ~Px]), generalizations (e.g., [>t
(3x)(Px)]), and PRPs that are directly "about" other objects such as our set-like
property [Ax x = Kripke], or the "singular" proposition [>t PHL(Kaplan)] that
Kaplan is a philosopher. 39
On this view, then, the constituents of a complex PRP are simply those entities
that are needed to construct the PRP by means of the logical operations, just as
the constituents of a set are those entities that are needed to construct the set. It
is in this sense that a complex PRP is dependent on its constituents. This then
suggests that, analogous to sets on the iterative conception, PRPs are best viewed
as internally "well-founded," or at least, noncircular, in the sense that a PRP
cannot be one its own constituents. 40
This picture of PRPs is especially amenable to activism. For as with set
construction, the activist can take the logical operations that yield complex PRPs
to be quite literally activities of the divine intellect. This leads us to a further,
more adequate model of the creation of abstract entities. At the logically most
basic level of creation we find concrete objects and logically simple properties
and relations (whatever those may be). The next level consists of (i) all the
objects of the previous level (this will make the levels cumulative), (ii) all sets
that can be formed from those objects, and (iii) all new PRPs that can be formed
by applying the logical operations to those objects. The third level is formed in
the same manner from the second. Similarly for all succeeding finite levels. As
in our initial models, there seems no reason to think this activity cannot continue
into the transfinite. Accordingly, we postulate a "limit" level that contains all
the objects created in the finite levels, which itself forms the basis of new,
infinite levels. And so it continues on through the Cantorian transfinite.
Now, how do things stand with respect to our paradoxes? As we should hope,
they cannot arise on the current model. Consider the first paradox. Since there
are new propositions formed at every level of the hierarchy, there cannot be a
set of all propositions any more than there can be a set of all nonselfmembered
sets. Similarly for the second paradox: since essences (as depicted above) contain
the objects that exemplify them in their internal structure and hence do not appear
to be simple, they too occur arbitrarily high up in the hierarchy and hence also
are never collected into a set. What about the two new paradoxes above? The
first of these is just a type-theoretic variant on the original paradoxes, and so
poses no additional difficulty. And although the concept of self-presupposition
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can be reconstructed in our type-free framework, the corresponding paradox still
cannot arise since there can be no set of all non-self-presupposing properties as
the paradox requires. 4l We seem at last to have found our way out of this dense
thicket of Cantorian and Russellian paradoxes.
But our task is still not quite complete. Recall that one of our first orders of
business was to work (cardinal) numbers into the activist framework. We opted
for the Cantorian-inspired view that the numbers are properties shared by
equinumerous sets. But just where do they fit into our somewhat more developed
picture? Intuitively, numbers seem to be logically simple; they do not appear to
be, e.g., conjunctions or generalizations of other PRPs. Hence, they seem to
belong down at the bottom of our hierarchy. It follows that there is a set C of
all numbers at the next level, according to our model. But this supposition, of
course, assuming the truth of the axioms of ZF, leads to paradox in a number
of ways. For example, one can use the axiom of replacement on C to prove that
there is a set of all von Neumann cardinals. I've argued elsewhere42 that, on
certain conceptions of the abstract universe that might allow "overly large" sets,
it is appropriate to restrict this axiom to sufficiently "small" sets, and such a
restriction would not permit its use here. This would still not redeem the situation,
though. On our model, I think we must hold that for every set there exists a
definite property which is its cardinal number. For it seems quite impossible that
God should construct a set without also conceiving its cardinality, the property
it shares with any other set that can be put into one-to-one correspondence with
it. Hence, the set C of all numbers must itself have a cardinality k, and so k E
C. But it is easy to show (with only unexceptionable uses of replacement) that
k is strictly greater than every member of C,43 and hence that k>k. Once more
we have to confront paradox.
Happily, there is a simple and intuitive solution to this paradox. How many
numbers must we say there are? Given our understanding of the numbers as
properties of sets, and our reasoning in the previous paragraph, if we divide up
the universe of sets according to size, then there must be as many numbers as
there are divisions. Numbers are thus in a certain sense dependent on sets in a
way that other sorts of properties are not. This suggests a natural way of fitting
numbers into our hierarchy in such a way as to avoid paradox: a given number
is not introduced into the hierarchy until a set is constructed whose cardinality
is that number. The number is then introduced at the next level; God, we might
say, doesn't conceive the number until he "has to." Since there are larger and
larger sets at every new stage in our hierarchy, there will be no point after which
new numbers are no longer introduced, and thus there can be no set of them.
Hence, our numerical paradox above cannot get started.
Since our model is informal, the only rigorous way of demonstrating that it
is indeed paradox-free is to formalize the picture of the abstract universe it yields
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and then to prove the consistency of the resulting theory. This can be done. The
universe of the activist model can be formalized in a first-order theory that
includes all of ZFC and a rich logic ofPRPs that embodies all the fine-grainedness
principles above; and this theory is provably consistent relative to ZF.
§8 Loose Ends
Many difficult and important issues remain, of course. Perhaps the most
pressing are those having to do with modality. For instance, a natural question
facing activism is whether God could have created more, fewer, or other PRPs
than the ones he in fact created. Morris and I argued in "Absolute Creation" that
there is a relatively straightforward answer to this question, but the hierarchical
picture developed here suggests that the question is somewhat more subtle. In
particular, does it not seem possible that God could have continued his collecting
activity and generated a set that contains all the objects in the actual universe?
Couldn't he then have generated new PRPs that would have contained that set
as a constituent? If so, then it seems there could at least have been more PRPs
than those that exist in fact. A second issue is engendered by the fact that the
constructive nature of complex PRPs seems to entail the doctrine known as
existentialism, i.e., the doctrine that PRPs are ontologically dependent on their
constituents.
An adequate treatment of these issues will require a clear account of the truth
conditions of modal propositions. This in turn raises the question of how modal
propositions, and modal PRPs generally, are to be worked into the activist
universe. Important issues all, deserving much further exploration; for the time
being we will rest content with the ones we've managed to address thus far. 44
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NOTES
I. "Absolute Creation." American Philosophical Quarterly, 23 (1986), 353-362; reprinted in
Thomas V. Morris, Anselmian Explorations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).

2. "Direct" as opposed to merely causing the thing to exist by bringing about some other series of
events that are causally sufficient for its existence. We take the notion of causation here to be
primitive; in particular, we cannot analyze it counterfactually (cf. note 5).
3. This doctrine is strongly suggested by SI. Paul (Colossians 1:16) and the writer of the Hebrews
(1:3), and is at least implicit in SI. Thomas (e.g., Summa Theologica I, Q. 45, Art. 3). Its most
overt expression in the modern period is found in Descartes (Principles of Philosophy, 1, XXI).
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The doctrine has been defended most recently by J. Kvanvig and H. McCann in their paper "Divine
Conservation and the Persistence of the World:' in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine alld Human
Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
4. Note that it is compatible with this view that other persons collaborate with God in acts of
creation. Our view only stipulates explicitly that God necessarily plays a direct causal role in the
existence of every object at every time; other persons might also play such roles with respect to
some objects.
5. Note that we can't analyze the causal relation here counterfactually as simply the claim that if
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Despite this logical symmetry between God and abstract objects, we claim that there is a causal
asymmetry.
6. Not least of these is Frege's own well known puzzle of the concept horse. See "On Concept
and Object," in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, translated and edited
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1903," The Philosophical Review 93 (1984), 03-34.
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essentially the analysis of number developed in Bealer, Quality alld Concept, ch. 6.
10. Quoted in M. Hallett, Cantorian Set Theory and the Limitation of Size (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984), 122. Hallett, I should note, disputes the idea that Cantor held that cardinal numbers
are concepts or properties.
11. For a recent development and defense of this position, see P. Maddy, "Sets and Numbers,"
Nous 15 (1981), 495-511.
12. B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937), 112ff.
13. See Bealer, Quality and Concept, ch. 5, and Jubien, "Models of Property Theory ," unpublished.
14. Cocchiarella, "Review of Bealer, Quality alld Concept, " Journal ofSymbolic Logic, 51 (1983).
15. Ibid.

16. Cf., e.g., G. Boolos, "The Iterative Conception of Set," Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971),
215-231.
17. G. Cantor, Gesammelte Abhandlungen (Berlin: Springer, 1932), 204.
18. R. Dedekind, Essays ill the Theory of Numbers, trans. by W. W. Beman (New York: Dover,
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21. Cf., e.g., W, Kohler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: The New American Library, 1947).
22. That is, possible in the sense of all the collections he can form from all the nonsets there happen
to be; I don't want to suggest that [here could be sets containing "merely possible" objects, of which
I think there are none.
23. Let me register my awareness that this is no trivial postulate, and that it deserves much further
discussion for which there is simply no room here.
24. A very similar paradox arises in connection with the notion of a possible world. See M. Loux
(ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979),52-03; P. Grim, 'There
Is No Set of All Truths," Analysis 44 (1984), 206-08; S. Bringsjord, "Are There Set-theoretic
Possible Worlds?" Analysis 45 (1985), 64; C. Menzel, "On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds," Analysis
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25. This is what can be called a "fine-grainedness" principle that is natural to those conceptions of
PRPs that tend to individuate them on psychological grounds, e.g., that properties are identical if
it is not possible to conceive of the one without conceiving of the other. Cf., e.g., Chisholm, The
First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), ch. I; Plantinga, The Nature of
Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). For more formal developments of this conception,
cf. Bealer, Quality and Concept, and C. Menzel, "A Complete Type-free 'Second-order' Logic and
Its Philosophical Foundations," Report No. CSLI-86-40, Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Stanford University, 1986.
26. A general notational remark: [Ax] . . . Xn A], where A is a (for our purposes) first order formula
is the n-place relation that holds among entities a].. . ,an just in case A(x/a,), O<i<n+ 1. Where
n = 0, this is just the proposition that A.
27. Where A

>.:- B means,

in essence, that A is in one-to-one correspondence with a subset of B.

28. Cf., e.g., Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, ch.S.
29. Both of these arguments are essentially just special cases of an argument schema that is generally
applicable to all n-place relations, n>':- 0 (where O-place relations are propositions). Let A be the
set of all n-place relations, for some given n. For any (n + I )-place relation R, we have the fine-grainedness principle that, for any x and y,
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where the complex terms here signify the n-place relations that result from "plugging" x and y
respectively into the n+ I" argument place of R. Assuming that any object can be so plugged into
our relation R, it follows from (** n) that there is a one-to-one correspondence between Pow (A) and
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30. As we'll see below. we can even give the objector the power set axiom and the fine-grainedness
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power set in our activist framework.
31. r have argued this at length in "On the Iterative Explanation of the Paradoxes," Philosophical
Studies 49 (I986), 37-61.
32. Of course, the paradoxes above aside, in such a picture the axiom of replacement would have
to be restricted in some way, else replacing on, e.g., the set Ht.. SET(x)] : x is a set} would yield
the set of all sets. Cf. Menzel, "On the Iterative Explanation."
33. Specifically, let the order ord(i) of the basic type i be 0; and if t is the type (II,
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ord(t) = max(ord(tt), ... , ord(tn )); then we can say that one type t is higher than another t' just
in case ord(t) > ord(t').
34. Note that to pull this off in any sort of formal detail one would have to assign types to sets as
well. Since sets on the cumulative picture would be able to contain entities of all finite types, we
would also have to move to a transfinite type theory. However, as we'll see, the issue is moot.
35. To use Russell's term; see his "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types," in J.
van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Godel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 161.
36. E.g., the theory in E. Zaita, Abstract Objects (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), ch. 5.
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38. More exactly, and more generally, for every formula A(s), where 's' is a variable occurring
free in A that ranges over sets of properties of individuals, we define the condition of being
self-presupposing with respect to A (SPA) such that, for any property P of individuals, SPA(P) iff
for some s. P = [Ax A(s)] and PES. Consider now the set s* = {P: -SPA(P) (which exists by
the axiom of separation). Let P*= [AxA(sx)], and let's ask: SPA(P*)? I leave it to the reader to show
that SPA(P*) == - SPA(P*),
A similar paradox that doesn't rely on power set or fine-grainedness is found in Grim, "On Sets
and Worlds."
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Selected Logic Papers (New York: Random House, 1966), and Bernays, "Uber eine naturliche
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of metaphysical realism, cf. Bealer, Quality and Concept, Zalta, Abstract Objects, and Menzel,
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on Truth and Circularity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). A full defense of the claim
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41. In type-free terms, for every formula A(z) where 'z' occurs free in A, we define the condition
TSPA such that TSPA()') iff for some z, y = [Ax A(z)] and y E Z. It is easy to see that, on the present
model, nothing-in particular, no property-satisfies this condition. For any property of the form
[Ax A(s)], where s is a set, contains s as an internal constituent, and hence on our current model
can only have been constructed after the construction of s. Thus, there is no set s* = {y : -TSP A (y)}
(since this would be the universal set) and so no property y* = [Ax A(s*)].
42. In "On the Iterative Explanation of the Paradoxes."
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arbitrarily large fixed points in the mapping X of (von Neumann) ordinals onto (von Neumann)
cardinals. This entails that for any n E C there is an m > n such that l{j E C : j < m}1 = m. But {j
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